Yes, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity

to share some thoughts today with the committee. I have no

access to any classified information on this subject, and, in fact, I

am serving now as a philanthropist for the McCormack-Tribune

Foundation in Chicago. Any free time I have—— Sir?

Yes; absolutely. But my free time is spent really

on my John Deere tractor on my farm in Illinois. But I would

like to speak from experience serving in heavy, light, and special

operating units in combat and also in peace support operations, especially

challenges after the main fight, where the entry into the country has occurred.

I believe that you always have to back up and ask, like someone

said earlier, why are we in Afghanistan? What is the purpose of

the United States in this commitment? I understand that the mission

is to disrupt, if not destroy, the al-Qaeda terrorist organization,

to deny them the sanctuary in Afghanistan, and to remove the Taliban from power.

Our military has removed the Taliban from power. I do not believe

that we have destroyed, but we have disrupted the al-Qaeda

operations, and we have denied the sanctuary in Afghanistan,

though it has probably moved to Pakistan.

But this is only the first phase of what our commitment is to Afghanistan.

Any military operations consolidation phase or a country

at war reconstruction phase is the most difficult aspect of any

operation. If we expect to see some semblance of rule of law, democratic

government, or a free market economy, and an institutional

capacity of Afghanistan, though not necessarily a replica of the

United States of America, we have a long way to go.

I have submitted enclosure one 1. It is the international community’s

challenge to a peace support operation, and it was discussed

a little bit by the earlier panel about military objectives, and other

than military objectives to reach goals set by the national command

authority. It is something that can be discussed later during our

questions following this testimony; but this chart shows the challenge,

and it has to do with not just the military, but it has to do

with money, it has to do with other organizations that have a very big role in achieving our goals.

If these are the criteria to define winning, and that is the democratic

society, a free market economy, some type of institutional capacity,

then we must stay the course and commit the time and the

resources, and see the mission through. I believe that our responsibility

is not only to destroy the enemy and make Afghanistan safer,

but I think we have a responsibility to make it better.

Nothing could be more detrimental to the prestige, to the honor,

and the credibility of the United States of America than not to accomplish

what we have set out to achieve. We must fulfill what we

promised to others. In essence, I believe we must walk our talk.

Our Nation also has the responsibility to our military, and I really

appreciate the remarks that Senator Nelson mentioned earlier

about leaving a fallen comrade in the status of a prisoner of war,

or an MIA. I think that is extremely important to our Armed

Forces. I do not think that we should ever send our Armed Forces

into harm’s way unless we maintain the will to win, and that means to complete the mission.

It is very important to the American people that those who have

already given the ultimate sacrifice have not done so in vain. What

hurts a soldier more than austere conditions, fear, loneliness, and

even wounds, is the lack of will to follow a mission through.

It took the United States 10 to 12 years to kick-start our form

of government. We cannot expect Afghanistan, Bosnia, or any other

country, torn by war, to do so in 1 or 2 years. That is why we

should never put a time limit on an operation, but maintain the resolve

for as long as it takes to reach our stated objectives. After

years of murder, rape, and destruction in any country that we have

been involved in, to love thy neighbor takes time. We Americans

are attuned to the 100-yard dash, not a marathon, and this particular operation is a long run.

The enemy has a vote when this victory is decisive. We are not

fighting a nation state in this case. The enemy is a terrorist organization.

Who decides on surrender? Who decides that they are defeated?

What are our measures for mission accomplishment? A very tough situation.

This particular fight in Afghanistan to defeat terrorists not only

sets the example for the world of America’s determination, and I

think Senator Hagel asked this question, but it is also critical to

the region’s stability. What is their perception of what we are

doing? What happens in Afghanistan affects the overall security of

southwest Asia. This fight is not defined only by Afghanistan’s national

borders. If so, it would be like our fighting in South Vietnam,

which at times had total disregard for Laos, Cambodia, and North Vietnam.

The enemy does not recognize the borders, but takes advantage

of the vulnerabilities that these seams offer, and continually creates

negative influences on our campaign; for example, one that

was brought up earlier were paramilitary operations in Kashmir,to distract our efforts.

The United States and our coalition have deployed a powerful

military force in Afghanistan, and power does matter. But power

is relative to the situation at hand, especially in unconventional

warfare. Tangible power, bombs, tanks, infantry battalions, are

easy to quantify, but intangible power is hard to quantify, and

though relative to this kind of conflict, it must be considered. Propaganda,

disinformation, black market payroll, and the manipulation

of religious beliefs are as powerful as any B–52.

We must be able to apply various means of power, and not only

the physical and organizational domains of an operation, but particularly

in the moral domain, where we achieve the most effect.

In your packet, I have enclosure two, and it talks about conflict

resolution and the time it takes to meet an objective, operating in

the physical, organizational, and moral domain. The biggest payback

is in the moral domain, but the experts operate in all three

domains to achieve their objectives.

It is imperative that the coalition can strike hard with one hand

and provide humanitarian assistance with the other. The people of

Afghanistan, like any other people around the world, respect

strength, magnified by compassion. Our mission in Afghanistan requires

a robust civil affairs, public affairs, psychological operations,

and engineering effort to provide the humanitarian assistance, and

development projects critical to reconstruction, backed up by a viable strike force.

Operation Anaconda, I believe, got the attention of the enemy.

The Taliban and the al-Qaeda spent a lot of time preparing a

firesack to trap and destroy coalition forces in the valley. They

wanted to bloody Americans, to challenge America’s resolve to continue

this fight. They lost the battle. They now have reassessed

their strategy and are now lying low, conducting reconnaissance

and small-scale guerrilla operations, influencing the peoples of remote

villages, and waiting us out. In their minds, we will not stay the course.

It is imperative that we sustain our efforts. In fact, I recommend

we increase them if we expect to win. It can be done, I believe,

without the appearance of an occupation force. Aggressive coalition,

and eventually combined with Afghanistan army patrolling must

continue to maintain pressure on the enemy, especially in the eastern

provinces. Our forces and efforts must adapt to the various regions

of Afghanistan, with a holistic strategy using military, other

government agencies, non-governmental agencies in a synchronized

campaign. We have had a hard time doing that in the past.

A robust, credible Afghanistan army cannot be built without

money, quality weapons, a multi-ethnic force mix, a sense of pride

of being a part of that army, and a sense of purpose in support of

the country. The army should have a fair representation of not only

Tajiks and Panjshiris, but also Pushtuns. The benefits of being a

part of this army must outweigh anything that the warlords, terrorists,

or black marketeers can offer them. Our advisory efforts to

this army will be critical to success.

The international security force, along with the Afghan army,

eventually must operate outside of Kabul. They have no credibility

unless they do. To avoid confrontation, though there are always

risks involved in this strategy; this force must work as combined

patrols with the regional warlord militias. Regional coalition liaison

teams are critical to the success of these combined patrols, and that includes Americans.

We must recognize the warlords have special powers, and the

Karzai government, as well as the coalition leaders, must establish

a cooperative relationship with them. It is like dealing with any

faction leaders in any other conflict we have been involved in.

Fighting them will just lead to disaster. The warlords’ militia

should be made an auxiliary part of the national army, paid to protect

regional infrastructure, with emphasis on ‘‘we are all Afghans.’’

Without this cooperation, the road networks and bridges will

never truly be developed and open for trade, and the establishment

of a free market economy. Humanitarian relief aid will never get

to remote sites, and water wells, schools, hospitals, and communication

infrastructure will never be constructed, critical to the refugee return.

Right now, the lifeline for coalition forces is the air bridge. This

cannot be sustained forever. As you all know, the wings are being

flown off our aircraft. Ground lines of communication must be

opened to continue military and non-military efforts in Afghanistan.

The construction of major public works should not be done

with a Brown and Root model, though I must admit, I have had

great success with their support in other operations. It is very effective,

but it does not facilitate the commitment of the Afghanistan people.

Reconstruction projects are a great opportunity, providing work

and a sense of pride to the local communities. What we want is an

employed work force, not trigger pullers carrying AK–47s. A series

of regional arsenals should be established to contain heavy weapons,

still belonging to the regional warlords, as I think it would be

a mistake to try to take them away, and maintained and inspected

by the national government and coalition advisors. An inspection

program of these arsenals among warlords, supervised by the national army, should be instituted.

The U.S. military contribution to a sustained campaign to bring

a chance of lasting peace to Afghanistan and the region should be

as follows, and this is my summary: special operating teams, consisting

of civil affairs, public affairs, psychological warfare, and engineers

should be collocated with regional warlords, and tribal chiefs at key villages and nodes.

Military advisors should be integrated throughout the Afghanistan

army. Rapid reaction force to respond and support the coalition/

national/Afghan army should be established and on hand. At

least a combined arms brigade, American, to continue search-anddestroy

operations against al-Qaeda and Taliban remnant forces

should remain a robust infrastructure and institution support elements,

i.e., civil affairs, public affairs, engineers, medical, communications,

et cetera, need to be there to enhance nonmilitary reconstruction efforts.

In closing, our Nation has committed itself to the accomplishment

of this mission. We have spent considerable resources to date,

and we have sacrificed human life. We are obligated to stay the

course and win this fight. Thank you.

Now, I think that the team the President has put together in his

administration is made up of an awful lot of bright people. What

is the disconnect here? What is the disconnect? How do you explain—

and I am not suggesting you have any inside information,

but how do you explain this, at best, reluctance, and most probably

outright hostility to the notion of expanding ISAF?

Does it relate to the conviction that we do not have enough reliable

partners, and we will end up having to do it all? Does it relate

to your opening comment, that the enemy of the good is the best,

or however you phrased it? Try to give me some insight, knowing

the country, and having worked in the last Bush administration.

I am not trying to be critical; I am really not.

Let me say one other thing. When I got back from Afghanistan,

like everyone who makes the trek, I wrote a report; my staff and

I wrote a report and discussed it with the administration. I was

initially very hopeful that the President’s assertions about a Marshall

Plan, coupled with the recognition on the part of White House

personnel in the country and from the National Security Agency,

as well as folks at the State Department, that there is a recognition,

there was a need for expanding any security—whatever you

want to call it, security force beyond Kabul. To tell you the truth,

I was a bit surprised when that battle seemed to be lost by those

proponents who said that is the way to go. Help me out. What is this all about?

Mr. Chairman, can I add a quick comment to that question?

Because I think Senator Lugar hit on two key

things that I associate with from my experience in the military.

One is this overarching strategy. In the military we have something

called the commander’s intent, and that really sets the purpose,

and what has to be done, what is the end state of any operation,

and commander’s intent is something that goes to everyone

who is involved, and everyone then is supposed to understand it,

to execute it properly. So I think that that is essential, a strategy, a commander’s intent.

The other piece that you mentioned was the phrase ‘‘bogged

down.’’ We are associating that with the Soviet experience when we

use that phrase. But if it has to do with time, we are going to be

there for some time. So the point is, why do it on the cheap? Why

not do it right, and set it up as an example for the world to see

that we do follow through with what we say we are going to do, and complete the mission?

No, but I would like to—I think we can do it

better. I have looked back hard at peace support operations, whether

they be chapter six peacekeeping, chapter seven peace enforcement, et cetera.

When I got to Bosnia, I believed we were in a reactive mode. You

do not win. You do not accomplish a mission in reactive mode. You

have to be proactive, and we moved to a proactive mode. But then

if you are really good, you then go to the next phase, which I call

interactive. And that is some of the things that I think the ambassador,

and myself, and others laid out in our testimony, and that

is how you integrate with the communities involved in the operation,

and with the people that you are dealing with, the people of that nation.

You interact, so you really have a taste, a feel, you see what is

going on, and you know what to do, and when. And we got pretty

good at it at the end of our tour. But you cannot do that with a

base camp mentality, giving soldiers, hamburger joints, and cappuccino

stands. You have to do that by getting out, not sitting in

base camps, but getting out with the society that you are dealing with.

I would do the MFO different. I would use that as an emergency

deployment, readiness exercise, live-fire training, a dessert training

area for the United States Army. And if Israel and Egypt did not

like that, then I would pull out. I would tie the requirement into

some of the things we are supposed to be ready to do for war.

There is just a lot of things we can do to make these missions better,

more effective for our readiness.

Any of these missions, any of these missions that I have been

on—and in Bosnia I had 29 different units working for me, not

counting the allies. Any of these missions, when some kid looks up

at the American flag on the right sleeve of the soldier, you know

you are making a difference, because a lot of people hate that flag,

but I think more love it, and it makes a difference.